Five important policy initiatives were promulgated in response to the slowdown in U.S. 
Toward an Assessment of Impacts from U.S. Technology and Innovation Policies

I. Introduction
There is a significant academic literature assessing the meaning and impact of particular components of U.S. technology and innovation legislation implemented during the late 1970's and early 1980's in response to the productivity slowdown.
1 Assessments of the Bayh-Dole Act (e.g., Mowery, et al. 2001 , Rafferty 2008 , Kenney and Patton 2009 ) and the R&E tax credit policies (e.g., Eisner et al. 1984 , Bozeman and Link 1985 , Berger 1993 , Bloom et al. 2002 are especially common, but one also finds studies (e.g. DelaBarre, 1986; Lee and Gaertner, 1994; Bozeman, 1994; ) focusing on related technology policy legislative initiatives of that era. Despite the many useful and informative studies focusing on particular aspects of post-1980 U.S. technology and policies, there is a conspicuous dearth of studies providing a systematic and aggregate economic assessment of these foundational technology and innovation policies on industrial R&D spending. The purpose of this paper is to begin to fill this void by offering a first step toward that end.
In Section II, the U.S. productivity slowdown is documented and the attendant policy responses are summarized. In Section III, an initial assessment of these policies is proffered. Section IV concludes the paper with brief summary remarks and a call for additional study of this important topic.
II. The U.S. Productivity Slowdown
Policymakers in the United States have largely eschewed comprehensive or long-range planning for science and technology (Mason 1979 , Brooks 1996 . As a result, technology-and innovation-focused policies, even relatively sweeping policies, have typically been more responsive than strategic (Kleinman 1995 , Brooks 1996 , Crow and Bozeman 1998 , Guston 2000 . This implies that an understanding of technology and innovation policy change requires a considerable knowledge of context, usually changes in the economy or in national security.
Inasmuch as the technology and innovation policies examined herein are responsive to the U.S.
productivity slowdown preceding them, an understanding of those policies requires some attention to that economic decline. The BLS refers to this index as a multifactor productivity (MFP) index, although the academic literature seems to prefer the term total factor productivity (TFP). Simply, BLS's calculations assume that output (Q), at various levels of aggregations, is functionally related to that level's investments in capital (K), labor (L), materials (M), energy (E), and purchased business services (S). Thus, TFP = Q / F(K, L, M, E, S (Siegel 1979, p. 60) . Many thought at the time, and some may still be of the opinion, that such events were normal, one-time cyclical shocks to the economy, and movement in the TFP index was accordingly a normal cyclical response around more stable, long-term growth in productivity.
From both an economic and a policy perspective, especially as related to the U. Shapley (1979) and especially Turner (2006) discuss the Domestic Policy Review in greater detail. 6 R&E (research and experimentation) expenditures are more narrowly defined than R&D expenditures which include all costs incident to development. R&E does not include ordinary testing or inspection of materials or products for quality control of those for efficiency studies, etc. R&E, in a sense, is the experimental portion of R&D. For a discussion of definitions associated with the components of R&E and R&D, see Gallaher et al. (1996) . Atkinson (2007) and Tassey (2007) Regarding the Bayh-Dole Act, Mowery and colleagues (2001; 2005, p. 120 ) demonstrated that the aggregate university propensity to patent trend after 1981 is: "a continuation of a trend that dates at least as far back as the early 1970s; there is no [empirical] evidence of a "structural break" in trends in patent propensity after Bayh-Dole." Also, Link et al. ( , p. 1098 concluded from their case studies of Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the National Finally, the NCRA was expected to speed up the R&D process and lower R&D costs by reducing redundant research. 9 These economic benefits associated with RJV activity might then provide an incentive for a collaborating firm to increase its R&D commitment to the project as well as to pursue subsequent R&D projects.
Legislative initiatives have helped to make the impact of these acts long-lived. For example, the Stevenson-Wydler Act was amended by the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 which provide financial incentives to laboratory scientists responsible for inventing the transferred technology. It also enabled the laboratories to enter into cooperative R&D agreements (CRADAs) with outside organizations or parties.
The R&E tax credit was never made permanent but was reauthorized numerous times (sometimes retrospectively). Similarly, the SBIR program has been reauthorized several times, and the set-aside percentage has been periodically increased.
8 These leveraged R&D investments have been shown to increase the probability that the SBIR-funded project would be successful, where success is measured in terms of the probability of the developed technology being commercialized. See, Link and Ruhm (2009) and Scott (2009, 2010) . 9 Subsequent economic theory supports this assertion. See, Vonortas (1997) , Hagedoorn et al. (2000) , Link (2006) , Link et al. (2002) , and Combs and Link (2003) . Viewing these acts as a whole, an assessment question remains: Have these five postproductivity slowdown technology and innovation policies, and their amendments, had a measurable impact on aspects of industrial investments in R&D? 10 While various individual legislative assessments have generally concluded that effects have been positive, the aggregate effects have not been systematically examined. Moreover, we cannot conclude that the aggregate effects are straightforward and additive. It is often the case that policies examined individually seem beneficial but, when taken together, they are sometimes revealed as working at cross-purposes, perhaps proving less beneficial than assumed or sometimes even harmful (Rose 1993 ). Thus, a collective empirical assessment seems in order.
III. An Initial Assessment of Impacts from Post-Productivity Slowdown Policies
An inspection of the trend in inflation-adjusted industrial R&D investments in Figure 2 shows a decline from 1969 -1971, an increase from 1972 -1974, and then a decline in 1975.
Afterwards, the trend was generally increasing but with periodic slowdowns.
Insert Figure 2 about here 10 We thank an anonymous referee for emphasizing that technology and innovation policies are not discrete actions; one policy often leads to another policy or legislative directive. We contend that the five policies discussed in Table  1 are foundational in the sense that subsequent initiatives have built on their focus. Of course, additional research is warranted to substantiate our conjecture. Such research might follow a mapping process as that in Hall et al.
Thus, based on Figure 2 , it appears that industrial R&D investments began to pick up in 1976 prior to the introduction of the five acts discussed above. However, that increase may have been precipitated by economic factors other than the technology and innovation polices summarized in Table 1 . In an effort to explore the trend in industrial R&D investments that is relative to other economic factors, Figure 3 shows the ratio of industrial R&D investments to value added in the private business sector.
Insert Figure 3 about here Figure 3 shows that the ratio of R&D to value added begins to increase around 1980 followed by several cyclical declines.
With reference to the pattern over time in Figure 3 , we initially considered a descriptive model of the form:
(1) R&D/VA = α + β Year + ε where R&D/VA is the ratio of industrial R&D investments to value added in the private business sector, Year is an annual counter from 1953 through 2011, and ε is a random error term.
Descriptive statistics for these variables are in Table 2 .
Insert Table 2 about here The results from the estimation of equation (1) are in column (1) of Table 3 . The estimated coefficient on Year is positive, as expected from Figure 2 , and it is statistically significant.
However, the structure of equation (1) Based on the statistical identification of these two structural breaks, equation (1) The results from the estimation of equation (2) are in Table 3 in column (2). The principle finding from these regression results are that the estimated coefficient on YearDmy 1 is positive and statistically significant. We interpret this finding to mean that the technology and innovation 11 These break points were identified by both a cumulative sum (cusum) and a cumulative sum of squares (cusumsq) statistic at the .05 level. Chow tests also show that the breaks in these two years are more significant that in any neighboring years. 12 The Bayh-Dole Act and Stevenson-Wydler Act were passed in December of 1980.
policies summarized in Table 1 , and their amendments (and possibly related initiatives during the 1990s), had a positive and measurable impact on the relative level of industrial R&D spending.
But, this impact does not appear to be permanent. The fact that the estimated coefficient on YearDmy 2 is negative, statistically significant, and numerically larger than the estimated coefficient on Year could be interpreted as suggestive evidence that the relative industrial R&D impact of the technology and innovation policies under study has waned.
IV. Concluding Remarks
The findings presented in Table 3 suggest that the technology and innovation policies under study in this paper-and these are the policies that shaped the post-productivity slowdown legislative response-did indeed have a measurable impact on the relative level of industrial investments in R&D, but that impact has waned.
Thus, this paper provides two contributions to the extant literature, albeit that these contributions follow from what is an exploratory empirical analysis. First, analyzing the technology and innovation policies collectively allows inference about the overall strategic importance of disparate policies aimed at addressing our historic productivity slowdown. This is not to say that the policies were systematically integrated in design and intent, only that they had the same broad goals and, thus, were de facto strategic policies. A second contribution is equally important, suggesting the directional impact of these technology and innovation policies. Having such an initial estimate as we have presented here could be useful to policy makers who seek instrumentally to use technology and innovation policies to remedy future economic declines but who have no basis whatsoever for estimating the likely extent of their impacts.
That said, any generalizations from the findings presented in this paper should be interpreted cautiously. First, the ability to model the interaction of policies with contemporaneous economic events and with related non-technology/innovation policies remains quite limited. Second, as with many policy assessments, attribution is key yet difficult; thus, we do not know precisely from our empirical findings the extent to which the policies in question, even denominating industrial R&D investments by value added to control for other economic factors, increased or even leverages the nation's industrial R&D spending. A next and more challenging research step is thus to model the interactive effects of technology and innovation policies and both industrial and federal R&D investments to determine the net social benefits of policies. Bozeman et al. (1986) argued that firms are more likely to cooperative in research is the research is toward the basic end of the R&D spectrum, but the Act does not mandate this. Source: Based on and Leyden and Link (forthcoming) . Note: Yule-Walker procedure used to correct for serial correlation ** significant at the 0.01-level, * significant at the 0.05-level
